Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Authors

  • Juan Carlos Aguado Franco Universidad Rey Juan Carlos
  • David de las Heras Camino Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.37467/gka-revsocial.v1.1220

Keywords:

Social Dilemmas, Cooperation, Game Theory

Abstract

Social dilemmas are situations in which individual rationality leads to collective irrationality. Prisoner's Dilemma is the best-known game depicting situations of this sort, but there are other such games. Two other games can be created by switching the relative value of the outcomes: the Assurance Game and the Chicken Game. Whereas mutual cooperation is the goal for the Prisoner's Dilemma Game and the Assurance Game, that is not necessarily the case for the Chicken Game; if one person can provide a joint benefit, then it may make no sense for the second person to duplicate the effort. In the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, cooperation may arise as an equilibrium outcome. If the game result is infinitely repeated, cooperation may be a Nash equilibrium although both players defecting always remains an equilibrium. Multiple-person social dilemmas are examined.

Author Biographies

Juan Carlos Aguado Franco, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos

Doctor en Economía y profesor del Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis económico de la Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, donde desarrolla su trabajo docente e investigador desde hace 10 años. Su dilatada experiencia docente le ha llevado a dar clase en la Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Universidad Alfonso X “El Sabio”, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, y como profesor visitante en la Universidad ORT de Uruguay y la Universidad de Costa Rica. Ha recibido numerosas menciones y premios por la calidad de su docencia. Sus publicaciones y aportaciones en congresos nacionales e internacionales se cuentan por decenas. Entre sus líneas de interés e investigación destacan las centradas en el análisis microeconómico y la aplicación de la teoría de juegos en diversos ámbitos, especialmente en el comportamiento de los consumidores y en el estudio de los recursos naturales.

David de las Heras Camino, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Profesor de Teoría de Juegos en el Departamento de Economía de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Sus líneas de investigación abarcan, entre otras, el estudio de los dilemas sociales, con especial interés por los bienes públicos, y la teoría de juegos aplicada en la economía experimental.

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Published

06-03-2012

How to Cite

Aguado Franco, J. C., & de las Heras Camino, D. (2012). Cooperation in Social Dilemmas. SOCIAL REVIEW. International Social Sciences Review Revista Internacional De Ciencias Sociales, 1(2). https://doi.org/10.37467/gka-revsocial.v1.1220

Issue

Vol. 1 No. 2 (2012)

Section

Research articles

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